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Abstract
Evidence of climate change is largely undisputed but moderating the impacts
not only of climate change but also of resource depletion is a complex, multi-
faceted problem. Technical solutions will have a large role to play but engineering
behaviour change within households and firms is essential to harnessing the po-
tential for energy efficient consumption, production and investment. To inform
debates about behavior change, this paper explores some insights from behavioural
economics including analyses of bounded rationality, cognitive bias / heuristics,
temporal discounting, social influences, well-being and emotions.
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21 Introduction
Climate change and resource depletion are amongst the most crucial problems of our
time. As outlined in the Stern Report on the science of climate change (Stern 2007,
2008), greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are the biggest market failure the world has
seen; they are not ordinary localised externalities and their impacts are large not only
in global terms but also in terms of their impacts of future generations. Whilst there
has been some scientific controversy about the specific evidence with some expressing
scepticism about the extent of climate change, in Advancing the Science of Climate
Change, the US National Research Council emphasizes that there is a strong, credible
body of evidence, based on multiple lines of research, documenting that the climate is
changing and that these changes are in large part caused by human activities. As shown
in Figure 1, International Energy Agency estimates show large increases in global CO2
emissions between 1973 and 2009.
World CO2 emissions have risen from 15,624 in 1973 to 28,999 million tonnes
of CO2 in 2009, i.e. an annualized growth rate of 1.7%. Rises outside the OECD
have been particularly large and pressure on the environment is increasing as less-
developed countries grow and industrialise. So, without wide-scale policy and be-
haviour changes across all countries, anthropogenic climate change is likely to intensify.
Whilst evidence of climate change is largely undisputed, moderating the impacts not
3only of climate change but also of resource depletion is a complex, multi-faceted prob-
lem. Whilst ingenious technical solutions undoubtedly have a large role to play, it is
also important to analyse the behaviour of households and firms to enable a better
understanding of how behavioural forces can be harnessed to promote energy efficient
consumption, production and investment. Also, focussing on effective government pol-
icy, particularly in countries with underdeveloped energy infrastructure, is important
because positive behavioural change requires government policy designed effectively to
promote it. In terms of potential to save energy, a report by McKinsey and Company
asserts that there is vast potential to reduce end-use energy consumption because there
is a large untapped demand for energy efficiency; if this demand were stimulated com-
prehensively to encourage households and businesses to consume and invest in energy
efficient appliances and buildings then the potential energy savings could amount to
9.1 quadrillion BTUs by 2020 representing an annual abatement of up to 1.1 giga-
tons of GHGs per annum, worth 23% of projected energy demand (Granade et al.
2009). US estimates from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), based on more
modest assumptions about technological change and cost improvements in energy effi-
cient devices, nonetheless also identify large energy efficiency gaps and forecast realistic
achievable potential savings of 8% up to maximum achievable potential of 11% by 2030
(EPRI 2009), as shown in Figure 2.
4A major focus has been on changing the behavior of households: encouraging them
to insulate their homes, buy more energy efficient appliances, switch off lights and
equipment more frequently etc. What is the potential for reducing household energy
usage? Evidence from the US shows that residential use of electricity is complex and
spread across a number of household behaviours as shown in Figure 3.
Major residential uses of energy include heating and cooling houses, using of household
appliances, lighting and other uses, where the other uses include using a wide range
of household items from coffee makers to hair dryers to pool pumps. There is no one
major residential energy drain and each of these categories account for similarly large
proportions of household energy consumption. So the policy challenge is enormous
because promoting energy efficient household behaviour will require changes across a
wide range of household activities.
The Energy Saving Trust (2011) identify potential energy savings from household
behaviour changes and/or building and appliance improvements. For the UK per an-
num, this could save the average household up to £280 in energy bills and 1.1 tonnes
of CO2 emissions. Solid wall insulation can save £445 or more and up to 1.9 tonnes of
CO2 and if all UK households were to wash their clothes at 30 degrees centigrade or
less, this could save 620,000 tonnes of CO2 and £170million on energy bills. However,
5the disaggregated savings per change are generally not large; one household washing
clothes in water at 30 degrees or less would save just £12 per year on their energy bill.
The key policy question is therefore how to encourage households to tap into a number
of potential sources of energy savings even when the private benefits in monetary terms
are relatively low.
Households are not the only ones who can save energy; potential efficiency gains
can be made within businesses too. Figure 4 shows US estimates of rises in energy
consumption from 2008 to 2035 and shows that energy consumption in the industrial
/ commercial and transportation sectors overwhelms consumption in the household
sector.
Given this large consumption of energy by the non-residential sector, behavioural
changes within business have the potential to generate significantly larger efficiency
gains than can be harnessed just from the household sector. Overall, the evidence
outlined above shows that closing the energy efficiency gap requires coordinated ef-
forts across countries and also across different sectors within countries. It will not be
enough to encourage more energy efficient behaviours from households; firms should
be the focus too.
6In standard economic analysis, environmental problems are often analysed as
market failures i.e. as a problem with market institutions and not a problem with the
way that individuals think and choose. Private actions by households and firms gen-
erate environmental externalities, usually negative externalities e.g. a firm polluting
the atmosphere, a consumer littering / not recycling, because by definition - exter-
nalities do not have a market price. Collective action will not operate to eliminate
these externalities because profit maximising firms and utility maximising households
have incentives to free-ride on the constructive behaviour of others. This creates the
tragedy of the commons, identified by Hardin (1968) as the environmental prisoners′
dilemma which emerges because no one household or firm has an incentive to invest,
produce and consume in a socially beneficial way. If they did behave in the socially
responsible way, they have no guarantee that others will do the same. Individuals im-
mediately face concrete, tangible costs of environmentally responsible behaviour in the
current period but the benefits are spread over time (perhaps over many generations)
and across many individuals / globally so a socially responsible individual will gain
no benefit whilst suffering the consequences of the anti-social behavioural of others.
Overall, with rational, self-interested and independent economic agents, there will be
no private incentive to contribute to the environment as a public good and the solution
lies in filling the gap left by imperfect market institutions either by allocating tradeable
property rights, e.g. emissions trading schemes; or via Pigouvian taxes and both these
solutions have problems of their own.
Price factors have an impact on behaviour for example, Hassett and Metcalf
(1995) analysing the impact of investment tax credit policies on residential environ-
mental conservation investment found that tax incentives have a significant impacts on
conservation though also found that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in tastes
for energy-saving activities is important. Budget constraints play a role: households
and firms may know how to save energy but large upfront/sunk costs may constrain for
households, particularly those facing fuel poverty. Brutscher (2011a) analyses liquidity
constraints on households in Northern Ireland Continuous Household Survey (NICHS)
and finds that, whilst there is a positive correlation between income and electricity
use, a large number of low-income households use disproportionately large amounts of
electricity, and this may be because liquidity constraints prevent them from making
large upfront payments for oil. So they are forced to rely on electricity, which is more
expensive. Using data from the NICHS Brutscher shows that increases in income via
winter fuel payments significantly increases the probability that a household will use
oil and significantly decreases the probability of using electricity.
Faruqui and Fox-Penner (2011) assume that energy consumption is price respon-
sive but allow that managing price responses is complicated by fluctuations in demand
for energy. They analyse some potential solutions to managing peak loads; the lat-
est policies are founded not only on financial incentives and technological innovation
but also on customer awareness and engagement. Social norms are important; energy
utilities recognise that changing consumer behaviour is not only about lower energy
bills but also about emphasising health benefits, the virtues of being green, impacts
on children and doing better than your neighbours issues that are explored in the
behavioural economics literature as outlined below. Overall though, Fox-Penner and
Faruqui emphasise that there still plenty of potential to reduce peak demand by up to
720% by 2019 with 4-15% coming from residential consumers via demand-side manage-
ment (DSM). Dynamic pricing is likely to play a significant role in shifting demand to
quieter times to avoid capacity overload. With real time pricing (RTP) the consumer
pays the market price prevailing at the time the energy is consumed; other DSM ap-
proaches have also evolved to focus on dynamic pricing with peak reductions by rate
and technology. Fox-Penner and Faruqui conclude that CPP (critical peak pricing)
can yield the largest gains, particularly when enhanced with technical innovation but
significant gains are also possible with PTR (peak time rebates) and TOU (time of
use) tariffs, especially if enhanced with technological innovations. Technology boosts
price responsiveness, particularly important for the US where financial incentives pay
a dominant role. Innovations such as in-home displays and smart meters can promote
energy efficiency by reducing demand either via cash payments or price variation dur-
ing critical times periods. (See also Faruqui and Sergici 2010, Faruqui, Sergici and
Sharif 2010.)
On the production side, new technologies will also offer solutions that enable re-
ductions in the costs of energy saving choices for example MBA Polymers has developed
new plastic separation technology to facilitate plastic recycling. Even though plastic is
potentially more valuable than metal, less than 10% of plastic trash is recycled because
sorting and processing different types of plastic is so complicated; MBA Polymers new
technology manufactures a mixed plastic composite out of shredder residues from metal
recycling by sorting the plastics using optical sorting technology and then recombining
the plastics to make plastic pellets. The energy and processing costs are significantly
lower because recycled plastic manufacture is not a drain on natural resources espe-
cially oil and there will also be indirect energy benefits as people will substitute away
from conventionally manufactured plastics towards cheaper recycled plastics. (Source:
Biddle 2011.)
Another market problem that is the focus of standard economic analysis is asym-
metric / missing information and related principal-agent (PA) problems: people do
not have full information about the consequences of their actions, e.g. they do not
know what happens if they dont recycle, for example. PA problems have received a
lot of attention from policy-makers as exemplified in the IEA/OECDs Mind the Gap
(IEA/OECD 2007). This report analysed a set of 8 case studies from 5 OECD coun-
tries (Japan, US, the Netherlands, Norway and Australia) across 3 sectors (residential,
commercial and end-use) to increase understanding of the energy efficiency gap: poten-
tial energy savings are not being realised because of market failures including capital
scarcity, information asymmetries and split-incentives. The report concluded that PA
problems had a significant impact, for example 85% of annual energy use in Spain was
affected by PA barriers.
Imperfect information can be addressed via carbon labelling and similar initia-
tives. However carbon labelling is relatively new and has yet to be widely adopted.
A 2010 Which? survey showed that there is limited recognition of carbon footprint
labels: 20% recognised carbon footprint labels relative to 82% for Fairtrade and 54%
for organic labelling, though many countries including Japan, South Korea and France
are extending the coverage of carbon labels. In France labelling is being extended to
show water footprints and impacts on biodiversity as well as carbon footprints. Life
cycle analysis can also be used as a way to inform consumers about reducing use-phase
8emissions e.g. 57% of Levi jeans lifecycle emissions were from consumers use especially
from washing in hot water and drying in a machine; including eco-friendly washing
instructions on labels can reduce use-phase emissions by up to 90%. (Source: The
Economist 2011, p.14).
Standard economic principles can tell us a lot about how and why environmen-
tal problems emerge and some apparent inconsistences can be reconciled by recog-
nising that market failures are endemic whilst retaining the assumptions of rational,
self-interested and atomistic individual action. However, whilst some of the standard
approaches summarised above offer important lessons about the importance of technol-
ogy and monetary incentives/constraints, understanding how to engineer behavioural
change by households, firms and industries, also requires an understanding of how peo-
ple respond, sometimes imperfectly, to non-price factors. If it were just about prices
then carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes might at least give a significant lead
in moderating the problem but if behaviour is driven by non-price factors too then
taxes and trading schemes may have limited impacts.
So what constrains the behaviour of households and firms? Modern research
into climate change and resource depletion is starting to draw on lessons from be-
havioural economics in formulating a deeper understanding of the psychology behind
energy decision-making illuminating questions of how and why households and firms
fail to make energy-saving decisions. Psychologists suggest that policy-makers need to
broaden their approaches to encouraging energy conservation. Stern (1992) for exam-
ple argues that consumer responses to information and money are more complex than
standard economic analysis suggest and other motivations drive people towards energy
conservation. Similarly Black et al. (1985) analysed the behaviour of 478 residential
customers in 1980 focussing on the interactions between contextual variables, including
demographic, economic and structural factors and personal variables such as attitudes,
norms and beliefs. They found that personal variables have more impact in driving
decisions e.g. to turn boiler temperatures down, than major insulation decisions. This
suggests energy conservation decisions reflect an interaction of economic and psycho-
logical factors and principles from behavioural economics can be used to explain why
people dont always do the right thing. Behavioural economics can also provide in-
sights into how policy can be designed to overcome these problems in a scalable and
sustainable way.
Grubb et al. (2009) and McNamara and Grubb (2011) identify a wide range
of behavioural barriers and drivers to efficiency technology up-take, including psycho-
logical barriers such as risk/uncertainty, constraints on learning, social norms, disem-
powerment and procrastination; and behavioural drivers including fashions and social
pressure. They observe that uncertainty is at the crux of the energy efficiency gap and
so providing more information - whether via smart metering technologies, labelling or
certificates - will increase awareness and transparency of energy use. In particular,
if the problem is that people are not well-informed then carbon footprint labels, e.g.
the Carbon Trusts black footprint label, can be an effective way to give people more
information about the emissions associated with the products they consume so that
they can judge the environmental impact of their purchases.
Gowdy (2008) argues that apparently non-rational behaviour is central to human
decision-making and so any approach based on an assumption that people are rational
9and self-regarding will be seriously flawed. Cognition reflects an interaction of rational
and emotional decision-making processes and a greater focus on a unified theory of
decision-making, e.g. as offered by neuroeconomics, can also illuminate environmental
decision-making. This paper will explore some of these insights from behavioural eco-
nomics in order to illuminate debates about energy, the environment and behaviour
change. 1 The following sets of behavioural economics principles will be applied specif-
ically to the analysis of energy and the environment: bounded rationality, cognitive
bias and heuristics; behavioural models of temporal discounting; social influences, in-
cluding social pressures on households to act in an environmentally responsible way
and on firms to practise environmental corporate social responsibility in building their
reputations; and behavioural analyses of emotions and wellbeing in the context of en-
vironmental decision-making. The paper will conclude with an analysis of potential
policy solutions.
2 Uncertainty, bounded rationality and cognitive
bias
2.1 Bounded rationality and uncertainty
Simon (1972) identifies some limitations on strictly rational decision-making and ar-
gues that a lot of behaviour takes place under conditions of bounded rationality: strict
rationality is prevented by information and cognitive constraints. This insight has been
applied in a number of analyses of environmental behaviour occurring when there are
constraints on information, knowledge and learning. Shogren and Taylor (2008) draw
on Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) in identifying three aspects to limits on rational be-
haviour as seen in environmental behavioural economics: bounded rationality, bounded
willpower and bounded self-interest. Just increasing the availability of information is
not necessarily the simple solution it seems; Leiserowitz et al. (2010b) note that often,
the behaviours that would be most effective (e.g. driving cars less often) are neglected
in favour of the less arduous behaviours such as switching off lights; knowledge and
belief are not enough and just because people have knowledge about the benefits of
environmental actions does not mean that they will engage in those actions.
One fundamental constraint on rationality is lack of knowledge though Stern
(2000) argues that whilst knowledge is a necessary component in engineering environ-
mental behaviour change, it is not sufficient in itself. Pongiglioine (2011) emphasises the
role of knowledge in a behavioural analyses of climate change and individual decision-
making. In risky situations, deep psychological mechanisms propel people towards in-
action and apathy and this constrains pro-environmental behaviour and so behaviour
change requires a combination of understanding and procedural knowledge - i.e. prac-
tical common-sense knowledge about energy efficiency and the environment. To an ex-
tent this is consistent with the self-interest assumption and can be explained in terms of
standard economic models incorporating transaction costs. Problems emerge because
selfinterest interacts with subjective perceptions and limited knowledge/ imperfect in-
formation. Procedural knowledge is particularly important as it enables people to turn
1See also Baddeley (2012).
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subjective beliefs into concrete actions to reduce environmental impact (Kaiser and
Fuhrer 2003). Similarly, Reynolds et al. (2010) focus on knowledge deficits to explain
environmental inaction and empathy gaps. Pongiglione argues however that it is not all
about knowledge deficits; the main obstacles to behaviour change reflect an interplay
of factors: perception, self interest and limits to knowledge where knowledge includes
awareness, understanding and procedural knowledge.
Uncertainty about the future, as well as knowledge about the present, has a
dampening impact on decisions about energy and the environment. Decisions between
risky alternatives will affect both firms and households: firms in their investment deci-
sions and households in their energy consumption decisions as well as in purchases of
lumpy consumption goods such as refrigerators and boilers.
For consumption, carbon labelling can reduce consumers uncertainty about the
impact of their purchases and provide some guidance to environmentally conscious
consumers but the question of how emissions should be measured and reported remains.
Best practice would involve calculating emissions over the life-cycle of a product in
its manufacture as well as its end-use, but for many products life-cycle emissions are
uncertain, e.g. how do you calculate the end-use emissions from shampoo given the
variability in its use: end-use emissions will depend how long someone spends in the
shower and how hot the water is etc. (The Economist 2011).
Uncertainty also affects investments and, as noted above, technology has the
potential to offer numerous innovative possibilities in terms of ameliorating climate
change and conserving energy across all sectors: investments in more energy efficient
/ environmentally sustainable production methods by all firms; investments in the
specialist production of energy efficient capital equipment and white goods for firms
and households; innovative investments in renewable energy production by the energy
sector itself and also investments by households in microgeneration equipment e.g. solar
panels which, with feed-in tariffs, enable householders to become prosumers producing
their own energy, consuming some of it and feeding the remainder into the grid.
For any of these innovative investments, uncertainty is a profound problem. Large
sunk costs are involved; the investments may be irreversible, especially if the equipment
is specialist and not easily used in other production. In standard economic analysis,
real options theories of investment capture the impacts of uncertainty and irreversibility
on the timing of investment; with uncertainty target rates of return are higher so fewer
projects are viable and investment activity slows down (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).2
High target rates of return deter energy efficient investment because of uncertainty,
inertia and because natural diffusion rates for new technologies are slow (Hassett and
Metcalf 1996, Jaffe and Stavins 1994, McNamara and Grubb 2011). The standard
real options approach to capturing uncertainty is problematic because it is based on
an assumption of investors as rational maximisers; behavioural economics offers some
alternative insights in relaxing this assumption and providing an alternative analysis
of responses to uncertainty founded on an assumption of bounded rationality.
2See also Baddeley (2003), chapter 9 for a survey of real options theories.
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2.2 Heuristics and biases
Kahneman and Tverskys prospect theory offer an alternative model of decision making
under uncertainty, identifying a number of factors inconsistent with rational maximi-
sation including loss aversion, framing effects, reference points, heuristics and cognitive
bias (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1986). People are
affected by bounded rationality and cognitive limitations when assessing quantitative
information about energy and the environment. Research has shown that, in encourag-
ing drivers to be aware of their fuel use, gallons-per-mile is more effective than miles-per
gallon but miles-per-gallon is more often reported (Loewenstein and Ubel 2010). Status
quo biases will lead people to stick with old habits and avoid change, and to an extent
- partly this may be an economically rational way of avoiding the transaction costs as-
sociated with change (Pongiglione 2011, McNamara and Grubb 2011). However there
is evidence that it is not just about transaction costs; for example, in the UK switching
energy supplier is a quick and easy process; if a customer decides to switch, the new
supplier contacts the old supplier; cost comparison websites are easily accessible so
overall the risks and transaction costs associated with a switch are small. Yet, even
in the face of rising energy prices from the UKs Big Six energy suppliers, households
do not necessarily apply competitive pressure by switching supplier: a 2011 YouGov
poll commissioned by Anglian Home Improvements showed that 51% of respondents
are likely to delay switching energy supplier and would prefer to ration energy, e.g. by
wearing warmer clothing (YouGov 2011). This reluctance to switch may partly reflect
a status quo bias / familiarity bias.
Environmental reference points will be affected by context. For example, envi-
ronmental valuation based on stated preference surveys may be affected by a number
of disparities including divergences between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness
to accept (WTA) (Carlsson 2009). Also Knetsch observes that, in valuing losses of
duck habitat, WTP is only appropriate if the duck habitat is absent; stated WTP will
undervalue environmental resources and WTA should be used instead (Knetsch 2010,
Brown and Hagen 2010). Uncertainty and bounded rationality also lead to greater
reliance on heuristics i.e. everyday reasoning using heuristics, quick decision-making
rules of thumb. Heuristics will be used in a world of bounded rationality when people
want or need to make decisions quickly and simply (Gigerenzer 2007, Gigerenzer and
Goldstein 1996, Gigerenzer and Todd 1999). Sunstein (2006) analyses the role played
by the availability heuristic in peoples intuitive cost-benefit analysis of climate change;
he argues that if people have recently experienced serious tangible harms from climate
change then climate change will be perceived as a more salient problem.
Kempton and Montgomery (1982) analyse the use of heuristics in ordinary energy
consumption decisions and observe that miscalculations can lead to underinvestment
in energy efficiency, especially because information about energy efficiency is often
presented in a way that is intelligible to experts but esoteric to ordinary consumers.
Adapting old methods to new situations when old methods will not provide the optimal
solution is a heuristic device. For example, consumers will use folk quantification to
simplify their measurement of residential energy decisions. The use of these folk meth-
ods is reasonable in the sense that it saves time and effort in computation but it does
also lead to mistakes. Kempton and Montgomery (1982) analyse folk quantification via
interviews of 30 Michigan families, 10 of whom were using energy saving devices. These
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families used folk units e.g. familiar absolute measures such as gallons, dollars, months
to gauge their energy use: e.g. one householder conceptualised his energy consumption
in terms of how many times per month he had to fill his oil tank, i.e. he did not con-
ceptualise his energy decisions in terms of kilowatt-hours. People also focussed on peak
consumption - e.g. a woman described the impacts of insulation on reduced gas bills
by saying to her husband that they were no longer getting large $100 gas bills as they
had before. Kempton and Montgomery also identified a tendency to over-emphasise
certain forms of consumption, e.g. people overemphasised lighting as a drain on energy
and were more likely to turn the lights off than they were to use less hot water - even
though the latter had a larger impact. This overemphasis on lighting could reflect his-
torical factors (lighting always used to be the biggest energy user) and/or problems of
perception and categorisation: lighting output is more salient; we notice it more; it is
also a prototype representing the broad general category of electricity use. People also
focussed on first-hand experiences and experiences of friends rather than impersonal,
but objective, data summaries from organisations.
Kempton and Montgomery also identified biases when people did not recognise
that behaviour changes had had an impact on their bills. They found that some house-
holders focussed on the dollar amount of their energy bills, neglecting the fact that
consumption measured in dollars reflects prices as well as volumes, so folk methods for
calculating savings from reducing energy consumption neglected the impact of rising
prices and led to underestimations of the savings. Similar problems affected energy in-
vestments, i.e. by using simple payback methods without adjusting for price increases,
folk methods led householders to over-estimate how long it would take them to pay-off
their energy efficient investments. Overall, whilst heuristics are cognitively efficient in
the sense that they are easy to learn and use within a households general budgetary
decision-making, they lead to systematic errors in quantification, ineffective energy
conservation and underestimation of benefits of investments in energy efficiency.
3 Time, Planning and Habits
Climate change and resource depletion are problems that will intensify over time; sim-
ilarly decisions about energy efficient consumption/investment involve costs now for
benefits in the future. Given the importance of time to decisions affecting energy and
the environment, the behavioural literature on inter-temporal decision-making offers
a number of relevant insights. McNamara and Grubb (2011) observe that energy is
an abstract commodity invisible and intangible and so learning about substitution
towards more energy efficient consumption is delayed by perceptions of risk and pro-
crastination; in resolving these problems habits and planning will play a crucial role.
3.1 Goals, planning and feedback
Intentions do not always translate into action and often there are conflicts between
declared intentions and actual action, e.g. a Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
survey indicated that whilst 70% of Italians surveyed are willing to increase energy
savings only 2% are currently reducing their use (Pongiglione 2011). People may want
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to reduce emissions but will not approve of it if it has tangible consequences for them-
selves; e.g. American survey evidence shows that 78% of Americans oppose gasoline
tax and 60% oppose business energy taxes (Leiserowitz 2006) but even though people
may express concerns about climate change, there is limited real commitment to envi-
ronmental action by Americans: 52% of Americans claimed to support Kyoto Treaty
in principle but if they had to pay an extra $50 per month then they would oppose it
(Sunstein 2006).
Intentions can be reinforced when people make a concrete commitment to con-
serving energy, and the commitment may endure even when the initial incentive to
commit is temporary. Cialdini (2007) describes the enduring impact of lowball tactics
in promoting changes in habits a lowball being a tempter offer which is later with-
drawn. Pallak et al. analysed the gas consumption behaviour of a sample of Iowan
households. A control group of households were given some energy saving tips but
the advice had no significant impact on their energy use. Then a matching sample of
households were told that they would receive positive publicity for their efforts; they
would be identified as energy saving citizens in local newspaper articles. The publicity
treatment had a significant, positive effect with each homeowner saving on average
422 cubic feet of natural gas, equivalent to first month savings of 12.2% in gas con-
sumption. But the most interesting result occurred when the households were sent a
letter telling them that they would not receive any positive publicity after all - yet, on
average, these households increased their fuel savings to 15.5% in the second month.
Pallack et al. found similar results in an analysis of air-conditioning use. These ap-
parently anomalous results have been attributed to the fact that the initial promise of
publicity encouraged householders to make a commitment to energy reduction and this
commitment did not disappear when the promise of positive publicity was withdrawn
(Cialdini 2007, Pallack et al.1980).
Goals modify behaviour; ambitious goals lead to greater and more prolonged effort
(Locke and Latham 2006). Planning is also important because effective behaviour is not
just about intention; behavioural control including self-confidence guides action (Ajzen
1991). Whilst standard economics emphasises the role of monetary incentives, Bamberg
(2002) analyses two environmental behaviours using and new bus route and shopping
in a bio-shop. He finds that forming intentions not just about the goal itself but also
about implementing the new behaviours increases the likelihood of the new behaviours.
Implementation intentions substitute for monetary incentives: monetary incentives
alone also increase the likelihood of the new behaviour but monetary incentives and
implementation incentives together do not have an additional impact. Becker (1978)
emphasises the importance of feedback alongside ambitious goal-setting. He analysed
the behaviour of US families in identical 3 bedroom houses: 80 families were asked to
set goals for reducing energy consumption during the summer: half were set an easy
goal; the other half were set a difficult goal. Half of each group were given regular
feedback 3 times per week. An additional 20 families were used as a control group.
The group with the difficult goal and regular feedback was the only group to consume
significantly less electricity; they reduced their electricity consumption by at least 13%.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) emphasise the importance of salient and frequent
feedback in changing habits. Hargreaves, Nye and Burgess (2010) found that infor-
mation feedback on electricity consumption leads to decreased use. Darby (2006) also
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emphasises the importance of direct feedback with information presented clearly, using
computerised tools; indirect feedback is more effective in addressing larger impacts,
e.g. seasonal impacts on energy consumption. Direct feedback via self-meter reading,
direct displays, consumption displays and interactive feedback lead to savings of up to
15%; indirect feedback, e.g. frequent bills and information leaflets lead to savings of
up to 10% (Darby S 2006, Brophy Haney et al. 2009b). Performance feedback is also
important because it enables more effective learning.
3.2 Behavioural discount functions
As noted above, environmental decisions are often taken with a view to the future and
in judging future consequences, people will be affected by present bias. This links to
dual-self models, e.g. Thaler and Sunstein (2006) argue intrapersonal conflicts between
a Doer self and a Planner self makes people unwilling to take action if the costs are
immediate and the payoffs more distant because the Doer prefers to spend less in the
present. This can lead to an excessive focus on current costs / benefits relative to future
costs/ benefits and encourages procrastination and over-indulgence. In an environmen-
tal context, this may also lead people to underestimate the benefits of environmental
actions. For example, even when long-term incentives and payoffs are substantial,
only 19% of Europeans opt for home insulation and only 6% opt for eco-friendly cars
(Pongiglione 2011 citing Special Eurobarometer Survey 75.1). Also, Hepburn, Duncan
and Papachristodoulou (2010) apply hyperbolic discounting to a fishery model: fish-
eries collapses because at minimum viable population the marginal rate of return is
lower than relatively high early-on discount rate. This may explain the demise of Cana-
dian cod and Peruvian anchoveta fisheries. Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) also argue
that environmental decision-making is affected by procrastination: attention wanders,
peripheral factors subconsciously influence decisions and perceptions, though commit-
ment devices and default options can influence constructive choices and enable effective
planning.
Brutscher (2011b) assesses temporal inconsistencies in energy decision-making us-
ing data from Northern Ireland Continuous Household Survey analysing pre-payment in
household electricity consumption. He finds that upfront payments are associated with
higher electricity consumption than ex post payment even when transactions costs are
higher and feedback is given about electricity use. Using data from 10,124 households,
he explores links between top-up behaviour of households using pre-payment meters.
Households will balance the costs and benefits of top-ups topping-up is costly because
of foregone interest but this is balanced by the benefit of convenience topping-up a
pre-payment meter means that the household does not have to make a payment every
time they use electricity. 3
Brutscher identifies two behavioural anomalies in these households electricity con-
sumption: he finds that people top-up more often with smaller amounts than optimal;
and increases in tariff do not lead to equal changes in number and amounts of top-
up; instead increases in tariff lead to increases just in the number of top-ups. These
anomalies cannot be explained by learning because there is little adjustment in months
following change in tariff so learning is slow or non-existent. ODonoghue and Rabin
3See also Gourville and Soman (1998) on temporally separating payments from consumption.
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(1999) might argue that top-ups are used by sophisticated agents as a pre-commitment
device to save electricity to resolve the conflict between an impatient present self and
a patient future self but this does not explain the asymmetric adjustment of number
versus amount of top-ups; if the behaviour reflects pre-commitment then there should
still be a unique optimal top-up amount but the data suggest that people are adjusting
by choosing different top-up amounts depending on the timing.
A more convincing explanation draws on Thalers mental accounting model (Thaler
1985, 1999). People perceive costs differently depending on the context and whilst each
£10 payment seems trivial, one larger £100 payment does not. To test the mental ac-
counting model Brutscher uses data from a natural experiment to analyse the impact
of an exogenous increase in minimum top-up amount. An increase in minimum top-up
amount from £2 to £15 was implemented in May 2009 and this did lead to decreases
in electricity use: electricity consumption decreased by around 15 KWh as a result of
the change in minimum top-up. This is consistent with mental accounting models in
which people treat small amounts as trivial even when paid more frequently (Brutscher
2011b).
4 Social influences
Social influences will take three major forms: informational influence/ social learning;
social preferences and values; and normative influence/peer pressure.
4.1 Social learning
In terms of informational influence, social learning about energy efficiency can take
place effectively within group settings. Nye and Hargreaves (2010) outlined evidence
from two UK experiments conducted by Global Action Plan in which environmental
information was communicated in a social setting. One (the Environmental Champions
Program) was office-based and focussed on 280 people with a team of energy champi-
ons drawn from different departments. These champions engaged in a 3 month com-
munication campaign, providing practical information about environmentally friendly
behaviour leading to a 38% reduction in waste production and a 12% reduction in
energy consumption. The second programme the Eco-Teams Program, focused on
household habits and involved neighbourhood meetings to inform communities about
energy use. There were a number of positive impacts: 16% adopted green energy
tariffs, 37% installed energy efficient light bulbs and 17% reduced domestic heating.
Participants observed that the EcoTeams Program worked because, whilst they were
environmentally aware before participating, practical knowledge was beingcommuni-
cated to participants.
Social information can be useful in setting reference points. For example, without
a reference point, information about embedded emissions is of little use to the consumer
because they do not know what it means, reference points can be set around social
comparisons; for example, the French supermarket chain E. Leclerc is introducing
carbon labelling which includes information not only about carbon emissions per kg
for specific products but also total carbon footprints for each trolley of food alongside
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a social comparison with the average trolley footprint (The Economist 2011, p 14).
4.2 Social preferences fairness and inequity aversion
Gowdy (2008) applies insights from behavioural economics and experimental psychol-
ogy to the issue of climate change and specifically to the question of reducing CO2
emissions. He argues that resolving the current crisis of sustainability needs more
emphasis on broader facets of human behaviour e.g. greed, egoism, cooperation and
altruism. Models of extreme rationality will be of limited value in encouraging people
to consider more carefully their energy and environment decisions; financial incentives
may in fact crowd out intrinsic motivations and feelings of collective responsibility and
so environmental policy should draw on cooperative, non-materialistic aspects of hu-
man nature. Frey (1997) argues that monetary incentives can crowd out civic motives
but money can also crowd in civic motivations when it is used to acknowledge social
worth of individual contributions (Frey and Oberholtzer-Gee 1997).
Individual preferences and attitudes will be affected by differences in age, gender,
education, socio-economic status, and political views. Costa and Kahn (2010) that
political opinions play a role, identifying rising polarization in environmental attitudes
between political groups: liberals and environmentalists are more responsive to en-
vironmental nudges than average and Costa and Kahns econometric estimates show
3%/6% reductions in energy consumption in Democratic households for low/high users
but a 1% increase in consumption in Republican households. Republicans increase elec-
tricity consumption in response to nudges either because they are defiers or because of
boomerang effects (which occur when people are over-achieving relative to others and
so adjust their performance downwards, see also below). Fairness can be incorporated
into individual utility functions, e.g. see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on inequity aversion,
but subjectivity is still problematic as the question remains of how to assign weights to
inequity aversion. Gowdy (2008) notes that distributive preferences include account-
ability, efficiency, need and equality equality raises moral questions and accountability
implies that polluters should pay proportionally to emissions. Concerns about fairness
will also affect the global management of environmental decision-making, especially
with respect to the developing world.4 Dealing with climate change will need coop-
eration, trust and reciprocity; and even when cooperative frameworks are imperfect,
participation can establish credibility and good will (Gowdy 2008). Given that the
North got rich by burning fossil fuels is it fair to tell the developing world to stop using
them? Stiglitz (2006) argues that a fair solution could be to implement a common
global carbon tax and allow each country to keep the tax revenues so that if less de-
veloped countries are polluting more then they will also have more taxation revenue to
spend on reducing capital and labour taxes.
4.3 Social pressures and social norms
There is a large literature from behavioural economics on the impact of social pressure
and social norms on environmental decision-making. Social norms will drive public-
4 See also Rosser and Rosser (2006) on evolution of global environmental institutions with growth.
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spirited behaviour and conditional contributions to public goods and these norms and
pressures will be affected by the values and attitudes outlined above.
Schultz (1999) notes that descriptive norms can be communicated in written in-
formation; conformity does not require the direct observation of others. He investigated
participants awareness of causal relationships between descriptive social norms and be-
haviour and found that normative information about average recycling by neighbour-
hood families increased the amount and frequency of recycling. Similarly, Goldstein
et al. (2008) analysed hotel towel re-use and tested the impact of different types of
information; hotel guests were asked to re-use towels either to help the hotel or, for
the normative appeal, to do what their fellow guests were doing. In the third control
condition, the card did not include any specific reasons for towel re-use. Goldstein et
al. found that the card appealing to the norm led to significant increases in towel recy-
cling. Schultz et al. (2007) analyse the impact of norms, including descriptive norms
(which provide points of comparison e.g. to others consumption) and injunctive norms
(which incorporate instructions). They study these norms by analysing the energy con-
sumption behaviour of 290 households in San Marcos California. All households had
visible energy meters; half were given just descriptive information about consumption
in other households; the other half given were given the descriptive information plus
an injunctive message about whether the changes in their energy consumption were
acceptable or not. The observed impact of the norms reflected the nature of the norm:
descriptive norms were found to be constructive and encouraged people who were con-
suming too much relative to others to consume less in the future; but descriptive norms
were destructive because generated boomerang effects (mentioned above), i.e. people
who were consuming less than others adjusted their consumption towards the average
by consuming more. Injunctive norms were reconstructive: for example, a pictogram
of a smiley face versus a frowny face reinforced the descriptive normative signals.
Nolan et al. (2008) extend these finding using two studies aimed at assessing
the weight that people ascribe to social norms as factors affecting their energy conser-
vation decisions. The first study surveyed 810 Californians to explore stated reasons
for engaging in energy conservation and testing actual factors influencing conservation
behaviour; respondents were asked a series of questions about their energy conser-
vation beliefs, motivations and actual behaviour. Self-reported beliefs were assessed
according to answers to questions about how much they thought saving energy would
benefit society / the environment; how much money they thought they could save; how
often their neighbours try to conserve energy. Behaviour / intentions were judged by
the answer to question How often do you try to conserve energy? Motivations were
assessed by questions about reasons for trying to save energy e.g. using less energy
saves money / protects the environment / benefits society, other people are doing it.
Responses were rated on a 4 point scale from not at all important to extremely im-
portant. The findings revealed an inconsistency between the stated motivations and
actual behaviour: because others are doing it was judged to be the least important
reason at the self-reported motivation stage; but the highest correlation with actual
conservation behaviour was a persons beliefs about whether or not their neighbours
were doing it.
Nolan et al.s second study was a field experiment involving 981 Californian house-
holds in San Marcos assessing participants awareness of the extent to which their be-
18
haviour was affected by different messages. Normative information was circulated in
the forms of messages on door hangers; each message was illustrated with a graphic
icon. The messages urged the householders to conserve energy via specific conservation
behaviours (e.g. taking shorter showers, turning off lights / air-conditioning). There
were four appeal treatments, each appealing to different motivations: 3 appeals used
non-normative messages: protecting environment (environmental responsibility), bene-
fiting society (social responsibility) and saving money (self interest). The fourth appeal
was based on a descriptive norm with factual information about the energy conserva-
tion behaviour of recipients neighbours. There was also an information-only control
treatment people were just told that they could save energy by taking the various
actions without appealing to any specific motivation. Actual energy use in home was
the dependent variable and electricity meter readings were taken before and after the
intervention. This reliance on objective information from meter readings prevented
inaccuracies from self-reporting and/or imperfect memory bias. The data showed that
normative social influence had a direct impact on conservation behaviour and the so-
cial norm condition led to biggest reduction in energy consumption; people conserved
more energy under the social norm condition than either under the control condition
or any of the other informational conditions; however, the householders did not detect
the influence of these messages; they did not appear to realise that they were affected
by the descriptive norm.
Nolan et al. conclude that these findings suggest that nave psychology based
beliefs about energy conservation are inaccurate. Trying to encourage people to be so-
cially responsible / protect the environment rarely succeeds in increasing pro-environmetnal
behaviours perhaps because people have already adjusted their behaviour to these
factors. In changing the behaviour of recalcitrant consumers, new motivations and
messages are needed so that normative messages can reach new populations who might
not otherwise want to conserve energy.
Allcott (2011), drawing on research from Goldstein et al. (2008), Schultz et al.
(2007) and Nolan et al. (2008), focuses on role played by social norms in guiding
energy conservation strategies and identifies three pathways via which social norms
play a role: a tournament pathway via which people gain utility from out-performing
their neighbours frugality; a conditional cooperation pathway via which people con-
tribute to a public good if others do too; and a social learning pathway. Allcott notes
that boomerang effects can be explained most easily in terms of the second and third
pathways though he does also emphasise the role of feedback
Allcott analysed data from a randomised natural field experiment using Home
Energy Reports (HERs) in collaboration with OPOWER an electricity utility in Min-
nesota. The electricity consumption of 80,000 treatment and control households was
analysed. Each household was sent a HER with two features: an Action Steps Module
giving energy saving tips; and a Social Comparison Module comparing households en-
ergy consumption with that of its 100 geographically closest neighbours. The monthly
programme led to decreases in energy consumption of 1.9-2.0% but with decay effects;
impacts decreased in the period between receiving one monthly report and the next,
but then increased again once the next report was received. Allcott infers that this
reflects an interaction of social norms and bounded rationality / heuristics, in particu-
lar the availability heuristic (discussed above). There is an attention channel: people
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do know about energy conservation strategies but they need to be reminded because
attention is malleable and non-durable. Receiving a HER reminded people about the
strategies that they should be using. Given bounded attention to social norms, social
norms will only affect behaviour when norms are at the top of the mind.
Attitudes will also be moulded by family upbringing. Developmental psychology
focuses on the role of education in embedding habits from a young age and these habits
can be transferred within the family structure. Families will be influenced (either via
learning or via social pressure) by the recycling habits of other family members.Gronhoj
and Thogersen (2012) analyse the impact of parental attitudes and behaviour on ado-
lescents recycling behaviour. They focus on the role of parental influences and the
fact that parents can play a key role in teaching pro-environmental practices and the.
Family norms take two forms: descriptive norms normative information is conveyed
via parents actions; and injunctive norms parental instructions to their children about
pro-environmental behaviours. Nonetheless there may be differences across families,
reflecting generation gaps and differences in parenting style. Also, issues of identity
will be important the extent to which the child identifies with the parents will affect
the transmission of environmental values across generations.
Gronhoj and Thogersen analyse evidence from a stratified sample of 601 Danish
households representative of the Danish population in terms of socio-economic charac-
teristics. Families were interviewed via internet-based surveys with questions to capture
the influence of individual pro-environmental attitudes versus the social influence of
family norms on adolescents pro-environmental behaviour. Families were asked about
attitudes and actions with respect to specific pro-environmental practices including
buying eco-friendly products; reducing electricity use; and separation of waste for re-
cycling. Adolescents were also asked about the parents attitudes and actions. The
impacts of generation gaps, i.e. the difference in age between parents and child, were
also analysed alongside the relative weight of personal attitudes versus social influ-
ences. Gronhoj and Thogersen test three hypotheses: adolescents behaviour depends
on family norms and is more influenced by descriptive norms than injunctive norms;
the larger the generation gap the weaker the influence of norms. They find that ado-
lescents pro-environmental behaviour is heavily influenced by their own attitudes but
also by the existence and strength of parental pro-environmental attitudes and actions.
Parents actions, i.e. the descriptive norms, dominate the injunctive norms and the im-
pact of the descriptive norms is also dependent on the childs perception of their parents
behaviour i.e. the extent to which their parents actions are visible and unambiguous.
Gronhoj and Thogersen conclude that parents are important role models and can play
a key role in moulding the pro-environmental behaviour of adolescents
4.4 Social influences on firms: reputation-building and corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR)
Social influences will affect firms as well as households and many companies are incor-
porating environmental responsibility into their corporate social responsibility (CSR)
strategies, reflecting a desire to accumulate social capital via reputation building (Bro-
phy et al. 2009a). Data from the Carbon Discloure Project suggests that pressures
from competitors and investors as well as customers will affect firms decisions to dis-
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close their carbon emissions, though this will reflect signalling solutions to asymmetric
information problems as well as reputational concerns (Brophy Haney 2011). Corpo-
rate attitudes towards fairness are important and firms are not invariably engaged in
an unquestioning pursuit of profit and firms will act according to environmental prin-
ciples e.g. a US Chamber of Commerce decision to oppose policies to address climate
change led to resignations by Apple, Nike, Pacific Gas and Electric, Exelon and PNM
Resources (Johansson-Stenman and Konow (2010), Brown and Hagen 2010). To some
extent this is a response to consumer pressure and firms do worry about consumers
perceptions of what is fair e.g. in terms of pricing (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
1986).
Firms are driving the adoption of carbon labelling even though it is expensive and
there are no international standards and this may partly be because of reputational
considerations and/or informing consumers. Profit motivations will also play a role
and there may be direct value in determining the carbon footprints of products, e.g.
Walkers crisps by calculating carbon footprint were able to save energy and cut costs:
they were buying potatoes by gross weight which mean that farmers were keeping
potatoes in humidified sheds and adding extra water that later had to be fried off.
The process of assessing the carbon footprint of the crisps revealed these additional
costs and so Walkers changed its purchase strategy to buying by dry weight; energy
was saved both from the humidification and also from the reduced frying time (The
Economist 2011, p.14). Firms concerns about reputation can also encourage them into
more environmentally sustainable production methods. There may also be reputational
competition amongst firms and this will be encouraged via information disclosure -
e.g. social nudges in the form of environmental black lists such as the Toxic Release
Inventory can generate social nudges because bad publicity affects relationships with
investors and competitors as well as customers (Thaler and Sunstein). Thaler and
Sunstein suggest that a Greenhouse Gas Inventory requiring most significant emitters
to disclose theiar emissions could have similar beneficial effects as the Toxic Release
Inventory, particularly given the current salience of climate change problems in the
public consciousness.
Firms will also be affected by the actions of regulators, and this may generate
strategic conflicts. When firms social motivations will interact with strategic consider-
ations it introduces additional complexities, for example Shogren et al. (2010) assert
that a regulators subsidy can interact negatively with social motives of a firm concerned
about reputation. Selfish firms will make an optimal effort and socially oriented firms
will be subsidised less than is optimal.
5 Emotions, wellbeing and happiness
5.1 Well-being
Gowdy (2008) rejects the standard rational actor view that there is a trade-off between
material consumption and environmental protection. Increasing per capita income
does not increase wellbeing beyond a certain point and drastic reductions in fossil
fuel use will mean a reduction in production of consumer goods; but if welfare policy
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goals can shift from income to well-being more broadly defined then this will be a
positive development, i.e. there is no necessary trade-off between the environmental
protection and wellbeing. Similarly in developing countries reorienting policies towards
living a full life rather than income creation, then this would alleviate pressure on the
environment.
Environmental problems will have an impact on peoples wellbeing, particularly
if they create anxieties for individuals. The European Commission (2002) conducted
7,500 interviews for 15 member states of the EU and found that 89% of respondents
were concerned about environmental pollution; 86% about natural resources and waste
generation and 82% about trends relating to nature and wildlife; 72% are concerned
about climate change; 73% believe that the environment influences the quality of life
very much or quite a lot relative to 64% for economic and social factors. These attitudes
are relatively robust over recent time with not much change since the global financial
crisis and recession. The 2011 Eurobarometer Surveys on the environment and climate
change found that 95% of EU citizens feel that protecting the environment is personally
important to them and 76% believe that environmental problems have a direct impact
on their lives though only 69% believe that they should be personally responsible for
using natural resources more effectively. For climate change, 68% of people think that
climate change is a very serious problem; 89% think it very serious or fairly serious; 78%
think that fighting climate change and improving energy efficiency will have positive
impact on jobs and economy; 68% support environmental taxes but just 53% had taken
some sort of action to combat climate change; 66% reduced and recycled waste. This
survey evidence reveals some inconsistencies between opinions about the significance
of climate change and concrete actions taken to combat climate change. In addition,
some respondents seem not to realise that recycling is an activity that can help to
combat climate change. (Source: European Commission 2011a, 2011b).
Desires to maintain current quality of life will also lead to inertia especially as
conspicuous consumption can signal social status. The sacrifices that people are pre-
pared to make will reflect their socio-economic conditions, e.g. a Pennyslvania survey
analysed the role of wealth and environmental attitudes in environmental action and
found no significant association between personal economic conditions and environmen-
tal concerns though people on lower incomes less willing to incur monetary costs and
richer people were less willing to sacrifice living standards and comforts (Pongiglione
2011). Other factors affecting positive environmental action include knowledge, an
internal locus of control (i.e. taking personal responsibility) and perceived threats to
personal health (Fransson and Grling 1999).
To assess the impact of socio-economic status and environmental attitudes, Bad-
deley (2011) analyses survey responses from 2764 respondents to Northern Irelands
Continuous Household Survey 2009/10, using ordered probit techniques. The data
suggests that apathy (low levels of reported concern about environmental issues) is
associated with reduced environmental action. Environmental awareness (familiarity
with common phrases about environmental conservation etc.) correlates positively and
significantly with the number of environmentally sustainable actions taken, though this
survey may be susceptible to self-reporting biases given the positive normative conno-
tations of positive environmental action. Larger household size also has a positive
significant impact, perhaps because social pressure increases when observed and/or en-
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couraged by others in a family unit. Owner-occupiers are also more likely to engage in
environmental action, perhaps because home ownership promotes lower discount rates
and more forward-looking behaviour. Socio-economic status (as measured by whether
or not a household depends on benefits), number of children, the age of housing and
whether or not the householders were public rental tenants were insignificant suggest-
ing that poverty does not constrain environmental actions and the presence of children
does not either.
5.2 Emotions and Salience
Weber (2011) notes the importance of voluntary reductions in energy consumption but
most in Western household fail to install energy saving technologies even if they would
save money in long-run if they did. They also seem reluctant to make personal sacrifices
in terms of lifestyle and some argue that this is because they have not experienced the
consequences of climate change. However, empirical evidence does not suggest that
lack of experience reduces motivations to act. Actions to reduce energy use are not
related to uncertainty about climate change existing, and have more to do with whether
or not people think that their behaviour will be effective.
Leiserowitz (2006) notes that people claim to be very concerned about climate
change, ranking it highly on lists of global threats; but when it comes closer to home
and people are asked to judge more proximate threats, climate change is low on lists
of priorities. Leiserowitz argues that people do not perceive climate change as a direct
threat and this links to the impact of vividness and emotions on behaviour; people do
not have vivid, concrete, personally salient affective images of climate change and so
environmental behaviour change is a low priority.
The evidence about the impact of first-hand (and devasting) experiences of envi-
ronmental calamities is mixed. Spence et al. (2011) analyse UK survey data from 1822
individuals and find that flood victims were more concerned about climate change and
were more confident that their actions would have an effect. Other studies suggest that
direct experience of the impacts of climate change may restrain action if it leads to cog-
nitive suppression of frightening realities (Pongiglione 2011). Lorenzoni et al. (2007)
observe that motivation depends on people believing that their actions will be effective
but a 2004 BBC poll shows that only about a half of people think that behavioural
changes will impact on climate change. This may link feelings of powerlessness. Ex-
perience of detrimental consequences of climate change does not necessarily link to
mitigation efforts and responses to questions about willingness to change behaviour to
protect the environment. Whitmarsh (2008) reports survey evidence showing that the
salience of risk does not predict behaviour: those who had experienced floods were no
more likely to think that the problem could be solved. UK flood victims felt unable to
control their situation during the floods and so did not expect to be able to take effec-
tive action against climatic events in the future. There were no significant differences
in the responses of UK flood victims and non-victims in attitudes towards combat-
ing climate change (Pongiglione 2011, Spence et al. 2011, Whitmarsh 2008). Direct
experience may in fact restrain action if cognitive dissonance / cognitive suppression
take hold; fear and helplessness may be paralysing (Pongiglione 2011, McNamara and
Grubb 2011).
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Strauss (2008) analysed responses from a Swiss rural community: 95 residents
were interviewed and most acknowledged that climate change was taking place but felt
helpless and prefereed to focus actions on things they can control. Norgaard (2006)
interviewed people in a Norwegian rural community and found that people recognised
climatic changes and had high level of knowledge about the climate but made no
mitigation efforts, instead associating climate change with fear and helplessness. These
feelings of helplessness may be exacerbated by a social organisation of denial because
motivation is harder if people feel that they are acting alone and that there is no
impetus to collective action, an emotive version of the free-rider problem.
Yates and Aronson (1983) emphasise salience and vividness and argue that there
is too much emphasis on initial costs; more vividness is needed in energy saving ad-
vice. Similarly, Bazerman (2006) assert that one of the problems is that environmental
damage is not a vivid threat: it does not engage emotional, visceral responses and
this encourages apathy. This could also link to salience and the availability heuristic:
people form their perceptions and decisions on the basis of recent experience but if
people have not experienced the consequences of environmental damage then they are
less likely to worry about it (see also Sunstein 2006, discussed above).
6 Policy implications
As outlined above, a wide range of behavioural factors affect environmental decision-
making and this creates some policy dilemmas, particularly in terms of whether or not
the best policies should rely on price and/or non-price factors. For policy-makers, en-
gineering behaviour change in the face of climate change and dwindling energy reserves
is a significant policy challenge, more so because long-term behaviour changes are not
necessarily resolvable via technical quick fixes.
6.1 Impacts of monetary incentives
Reiss and White (2008) assess policy makers focus on public appeals in encouraging
voluntary reductions in consumption to mediate demand. They analyse the impacts
of price shocks versus public appeals on the energy consumption of 70,000 randomly
selected households in San Diego, California using 5 years of utility billing data. During
2000 this area had large unanticipated increases in electricity prices caused by a range
of factors including increased production costs, design flaws in the electricity wholesale
market and actions of suppliers. Reiss and White found that household energy use fell
by more than 13% in 60 days or so after the price increase, reflecting investments in new
appliances and behavioural changes. The legislature then introduced a price cap and
consumption rebounded. California also had a media campaign at the time - aimed
at encouraging voluntary conservation alongside the price cap and Reiss and White
estimate that this lead to a 7% decrease in energy use. They conclude that behaviour
is affected by both prices and public appeals but public appeals suffer the same pitfalls
as conditional cooperation to a public god: given the private costs of contribution,
tangible benefits will only emerge if aggregate participation is high; overall this suggests
that a range of policy tools is required and effective policies should address price factors
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alongside public appeals.
Other financial incentives are important too, particularly when residential energy-
saving investments incur large upfront costs. A utility grant programme that paid
for 90% of home retrofits achieved penetration of up to 19.3% (Stern et al. 2006;
Dietz et al. 2009). Fuel poverty is another particularly pressing policy issue and
Brutscher (2011a) argues that social tariffs designed to help the fuel poor, e.g. a two-
part tariff with a subsidized price for low levels of consumption, is likely to exacerbate
fuel poverty because the problem is liquidity constraints; because fuel poverty is often
associated with anomalously high electricity usage, policies could focus on helping
poorer households to overcome liquidity constraints, enabling a shift from electricity
by facilitating heating oil purchases.
Policies to alleviate financing constraints have been piloted in the UK. The UKs
Green Deal was implemented to address the old and energy inefficient characteristics
of Britains housing stock domestic homes generate 27% of UKs GHGs. A study
of Pay As You Save (PAYS) pilot undertaken by BQ, London Borough of Sutton and
BioRegional in 2010/11 explains that Green Deal energy retrofits were offered to owner-
occupiers with costs spread out and paid through energy bills. Under the Sutton pilot
scheme, 67 homes were retrofitted with insulation, draught-proofing, new boilers and/or
microgeneration technologies e.g. solar photovoltaics (PV). The costs were financed via
a 40% grant and a 60% interest free loan - repaid over 10 to 25 years with repayments
on loans guaranteed to be less than fuel bill savings for the 25 year loads. The aim was
to understand what motivates people to install energy saving measures. Initially the
scheme was over-subscribed but after the first step of an energy audit, a large number
of householders decided not to proceed e.g. because the loan would not stay with
the house and so if they moved their investments in the energy efficient technologies
would be worth less. For those who did proceed, the involvement of London Borough
of Sutton made the scheme trustworthy; the future savings were another important
factor in the decision to proceed, as were improvements in comfort. Average spend per
household was 13,000 with CO2 emission savings expected to range between 6% and
52%. There was some evidence of cognitive bias with 28% of households opting for
10 year repayment which would incur loan repayments in excess of the energy savings;
of those who did select the 25 year payback scheme, 72% achieved energy savings
in excess of their loan repayments. Overall, the main lesson from the PAYS pilot
was that financial aspects are not only aspects that make a subsidised deal attractive
(Bioregional et al. 2011).
6.2 Regulatory strategy
Energy policy regulators have taken an interest in behavioural themes, for example
Ofgem has analysed consumer biases and their impacts on energy consumers, empha-
sising that problems of limited cognitive capacity, status quo bias, loss aversion and
time inconsistency. In policy terms, this can be understood within a framework of
consumer decision-making emphasising the Office of Fair Tradings mantra: access, as-
sess, act. Consumers access information e.g. about tariffs; they evaluate it and then
they act. Ofgem argues that policies must take this decision-making process, and the
behavioural biases that constrain it, into accunt (Ofgem 2011).
25
Asheim (2010) analyses strategic behaviour between firms / consumers and envi-
ronmental agencies postulating that environmental agencies will use information selec-
tively to promote intrinsic motivations to act responsibly. Voluntary contributions to
environmental protection partly reflect the fact that shirking environmental responsi-
bilities generates disutility. Moral motivations and intrinsic motivation lead to larger
contributions but not enough to ensure optimal provision of public goods. Taking these
factors into account, environmental agencies may not release all information. They do
not have to release signals if releasing them would have a negative impact on behaviour
change, e.g. a regulator will have an incentive to withhold a signal if it would com-
municate a low level of threat to the environment; in this way they can ensure that
high levels of contribution are sustained. Asheim notes that this raises issues of cred-
ibility: it is best to keep environmental agencies independent to ensure credibility.
Asheim concludes that, overall, using Pigouvian taxes may be less complicated; with
taxes the environmental agency has an incentive to use all the information available
to them. Attempts to promote intrinsic moral motivation are a poor substitute for
optimal economic instruments.
6.3 Smart meters
Another emphasis in modern energy policy is on smart metering technology to overcome
the informational constraints on effective planning of energy consumption. Bounded
rationality constrains effective planning it is a complex task to manage demand even
if time-varying tariffs are available. Smart metering technologies could enable people
to adapt either to real-time pricing or to other tariffs which match supply and demand
conditions more effectively. They could also be adapted to incorporate normative
information, to harness the social influences identified by Schultz et al, Nolan et al.,
Allcott and others, as outlined above.
McNamara and Grubb (2011) observe that smart meters can play an important
role e.g. in conveying helpful, immediate feedback to energy users enabling them to
develop new energy-efficient habits; however the rapid pace of smart meter rollouts in
Europe, by 2020 at least 80% of electricity customers should have smart meter - may
also hamper further innovations.
6.4 Behavioural nudging
There has been a strong emphasis in recent policy initiatives on Thaler and Sun-
steins (2008) libertarian paternalism an approach in which policy-makers allow people
freedom to choose for themselves but encourage them in the right directions using be-
havioural nudges (see also Dolan et al. 2010). Thaler and Sunstein argue that effective
nudging can be used to overcome various cognitive biases which emerge because of
poorly designed choice architecture, e.g. the status quo biases which emerge because
of choice overload / complexity. This insight can be applied to various aspects of pol-
icy on energy and the environment e.g. perhaps people do not switch energy supplier
because they are confused by the complexity of alternative options available.
In terms of heuristics and biases, including present bias and status quo bias,
default options on household appliances can be manipulated so that people expend less
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energy on heating water etc. More sophisticated measures could incorporate remote
control of household equipment to promote energy efficiency. Thaler and Sunstein
also emphasise the importance of frequent, simple feedback and this could be achieved
via smart metering technology. They also argue that emotions and visceral responses
can be tapped into using technological innovations e.g. the Ambient Orb is used by
Southern California Edison to engage visceral responses; it glows green when energy
consumption is relatively low but then glows red when the consumer is using a lot of
energy; analysis of its impact showed consumers reducing their consumption in peak
periods by 40% (Thaler and Sunstein 2008)
Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) argue that nudges can affect behaviour as much
as price changes and psychological cues can also be more cost effective. Households are
often reluctant to take easy energy consumption reduction measures even though the
benefits would be large. Non-price based behavioural interventions can provide trigger
points for behaviour change though evidence so far is not necessarily representative.
Studies of impacts of social norms as discussed above (e.g. Schultz et al. 2007) indicate
that a combination of descriptive norms and energy conservation tips has the potential
to reduce electricity consumption by over 2%. These are cheap programmes and could
generate 12.7 million tonnes of CO2 (MtC) of annual carbon abatement, comparing
favourably with generation of energy via renewables e.g. wind power, carbon capture.
Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) emphasise the importance of behavioural inter-
ventions which are scalable and so have large impacts, e.g. using market incentives
to encourage firms to adopt innovations that nudge consumers towards better choices,
recognising that - whilst price is important - firms interact with consumers in many
other ways too; and also rethinking the way that information about energy efficiency
is conveyed Some tailoring of policies would also be important: Home Energy Reports
could profile specific sub-sets of households, targeting those most likely to take concrete
steps towards energy conservation, e.g. the high energy users.
Support for behavioural nudges is not undivided however. Behavioural nudging
is perceived by some as a simplistic set of cognitive tricks (e.g. simple changes to
the way in which information is framed) and facile behavioural nudges (smiley faces
to generate normative influence). Some argue that standard approaches will have a
greater impact, e.g. Stern et al. (2010) assert that utility grant programmes have the
potential to reduce carbon emissions by 123 million tons per annum, a lot greater than
the 12.7MtC savings estimated by Allcott and Mullainathan (2010). Stern et al. (2010)
argue that there will be significant opportunities to reduce energy consumption only if
insights from behavioural economics are combined with other policy tools. Social and
behavioural science research shows that norms, social networks and social influence
and attention to convenience and design will work alongside financial incentives and
better information.
A major policy hurdle is that people tend to support policies that have only
a minor impact on their lives (Bord et al. 1998) and so small nudges might not be
sufficient to make a real difference. Loewenstein and Ubel (2010) argue that more and
better information is not enough and too much is claimed for behavioural economics.
Behavioural economics alone is not enough to tackle the policy challenges; e.g. using
social comparisons will have a relatively small impact in comparison with a carbon
tax and so behavioural nudges should complement not substitute for other economic
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interventions. In the end, prices need to increase to reflect costs. Stern et al. (2010) in
response to analyses of the impact of social influence, also observe that policy designs
drawing on the power of social influences and ease-of-use will deliver limited benefits
on their own: policy-makers need to use these features alongside standard financial
incentives and better information.
Rowson (2011) concludes that nudges are simple, cost effective technical solutions;
they can play a crucial role and a greater awareness of effective choice architecture
should not be discounted. It is important however not to underestimate the adaptive
challenge engineering long-term changes in behaviour is hard and complex. Policies
must be designed to ensure long-term, permanent changes in peoples behaviour and
habits, changes that can endure long after the novelty of a new technical gimmick has
worn off. In confronting this challenge, collecting more empirical evidence about how,
why and for how long various policies will work, is the crucial challenge.
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